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The reaction of U.S. farm groups
and our trading partners to the new
farm bill has been surprisingly frank
and sometimes harsh. Many farm
groups have given up the argument
that farm subsidies are temporary
measures needed until good times
return. For example, Mississippi
Delta cotton farmer Kenneth Hood
(who is also chairman of the National
Cotton Council) was recently quoted
in the Wall Street Journal as saying,
“The Delta needs cotton farmers,
and they cannot exist without subsi-
dies.” Five years ago, no farm organi-
zation leader would have used the
subsidy word, and never would he or
she have admitted publicly such a
dependency on public assistance.
The international reaction has
been more predictable and harshly
negative. Typical comments from
world leaders are that the new farm
bill is protectionist, that it violates
the World Trade Organization
(WTO) agreement, and that it is a
big setback to the world trading sys-
tem. Because we are entering a new
round of WTO agricultural negotia-
tions, it will be useful to examine
each of these charges. Are they
true? And if so, what impact might
they have on our ability to come to
a new WTO agreement?
IS THE NEW FARM BILL
PROTECTIONIST?
Argentine President Eduardo
Duhalde told the daily La Nacion
that “…the United States promotes
free trade only when it suits it, then
becomes an obscene protectionist.”
When a country is labeled as protec-
tionist, it generally means that the
country has adopted measures to
reduce the quantity of imported
goods flowing in. With the exception
of sugar, peanuts, and dairy, the new
farm bill does not restrict imports,
so Congress and the administration
can argue that U.S. borders are open
to imports of most commodities.
Those who argue that the United
States is becoming more protection-
ist do not necessarily mean that im-
ports are being reduced. Rather, farm
bill subsidies work to expand U.S.
production and exports, which tends
to reduce world prices and reduce
The new farm bill and the Agri-cultural Risk Protection Act(ARPA) provide us with good
insight into Congress’s farm policy
objectives. When all was said and
done, Congress felt no need to justify
the billions in farm aid as fulfilling
some broad public purpose. Rather,
the actions of Congress have re-
vealed a simple objective: to support
per-acre revenues of a chosen few
commodities—corn, cotton, wheat,
rice, peanuts, soybeans (and minor
oilseeds), barley, oats, and sugar.
Heavily subsidized crop insurance
protects farmers against per-acre
yield (and revenue) shortfalls, and
the combination of the new
countercyclical payment program
and the marketing loan program pro-
tects farmers against price declines.
In the end, the analysis that
showed that the vast majority of
payments would flow to large farms
simply did not matter. Nor, for that
matter, did the analysis that showed
that the majority of farmers who
rent their land will find that their
land rents are directly proportionate
to their government support, or that
government policies that protect
one sector of the economy invari-
ably lead to demands for protection
by other sectors. The objective of
supporting per-acre revenues over-
whelmed any other concerns. Why
per-acre revenues are a concern for
members of Congress is not a mys-
tery: when revenues are down, farm
lobbyists move into action. The poli-
cies passed by Congress will auto-
matically make payments whenever
prices or yields are low in the hope
that this will defuse political pres-
sure before it begins.
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production in other areas. Thus, the
United States is protectionist not be-
cause it is restricting imports but
rather because it is protecting its
producers at the expense of
unsubsidized producers in other
countries. For example, Brazil argues
that its farmers will lose more than
$1.25 billion per year in revenue be-
cause of expanded U.S. soybean pro-
duction. World Bank analysts
estimate that U.S. cotton subsidies
reduce cotton exports from West and
Central Africa by $250 million per
year. Do these arguments ring true?
Clearly, U.S. production of most
subsidized commodities that are ex-
ported, such as cotton, rice, corn,
soybeans, and wheat, would be
lower than current levels without
U.S. subsidies. And world prices
would be higher. It is exactly these
kinds of market-distorting effects
that the WTO is working to elimi-
nate. But is the new farm bill any
worse than previous farm bills?
Subsidies expand production
when a farmer’s decision to expand or
contract production results in an in-
crease or decrease in the amount of
subsidy received. That is, subsidies
are supply expanding when they are
coupled to production decisions. The
new countercyclical payment program
in the farm bill is largely decoupled
from production, so it should have
only minimal supply-expanding effects.
But the increased loan rates in the new
farm bill will have noticeable supply-
expanding effects. The accompanying
table shows the extent to which the
new farm bill is more trade distorting
than the old farm bill.
Rice loan rates have not changed
at all and cotton loan rates have been
rounded up a fraction, so the new
farm bill likely will not encourage
more cotton and rice supplies than
did the old farm bill. Soybean loan
rates fell by 4.9 percent, so fewer soy-
bean acres are expected under the
new farm legislation, particularly be-
cause corn and wheat loan rates both
increased. This drop in coupled soy-
bean support should please Brazilian
and Argentine soybean producers.
The new farm policy probably will
stimulate more corn, sorghum,
wheat, barley, and oats than did the
old farm bill, so the argument that
the new farm bill is more protection-
ist has some validity.
DOES THE NEW FARM BILL VIOLATE
U.S. WTO OBLIGATIONS?
Under the Uruguay Round Agree-
ment on Agriculture, the United
States agreed to limit spending on
domestic support programs that
are considered trade distorting
(amber-box spending) to $19.1 bil-
lion per year. Significant time was
devoted to a discussion of our in-
ternational obligations during the
farm bill debate, which indicates
that Congress took these obliga-
tions seriously. A significant por-
tion of government payments
varies with the level of market
price; high prices lead to low pay-
ments and low prices lead to high
payments. It is impossible to deter-
mine ahead of time what the total
level of government payments will
be in a given year because nobody
knows what market prices (and
crop yields) will be in the future.
But futures markets give us some
idea about what prices will be on
average, options markets give us
Old Loan Rate New Loan Rate Percentage Change
Corn (bu) 1.89 1.98 4.8%
Soybeans (bu) 5.26 5.00 -4.9%
Wheat (bu) 2.58 2.80 8.5%
Cotton (lb) 0.5192 0.52 0.2%
Rice (cwt) 6.5 6.50 0.0%
Sorghum (bu) 1.69 1.98 17.2%
Barley (bu) 1.71 1.88 9.9%
Oats (bu) 1.14 1.35 18.4%
Minor Oilseeds (lb) 0.093 0.096 3.2%
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some idea about future price un-
certainty, and the last 40 years
give us some idea about the aver-
age level of crop yields and yield
variability. Therefore, we can com-
bine the information in the futures
and options markets with histori-
cal yield data and put together
probability statements about the
level of the spending.
The graph on page 1 shows the
probability distribution of amber-
box spending for the next marketing
year. The graph shows, for example,
that there is about a 40 percent
chance that amber-box spending
will be $11 billion or less. And there
is a 71 percent chance that total U.S.
amber-box spending will be below
the $19.1 billion limit. This means
that there is a 29 percent chance
that the United States will exceed its
WTO spending limit in the next mar-
keting year. (Congress has in-
structed the USDA to take steps to
reduce payments if this limit is met
or exceeded.)
DOES THE FARM BILL REPRESENT
A SETBACK TO THE WORLD
TRADING SYSTEM?
Domestic subsidies to agriculture
around the world result in trade
flows in agricultural commodities
that do not follow free trade prin-
ciples, whereby countries with com-
parative advantage are the
exporters, and the importers are
those countries without compara-
tive advantage. Rather, domestic
subsidies often support domestic
production, and surplus production
is exported. The United States has
been at the forefront of the effort to
include domestic agricultural sup-
port in international trade negotia-
tions. This push led to the Uruguay
Agreement where, for the first time,
limits were placed on agricultural
subsidies. Modifications of U.S. do-
mestic farm policy lent support to
this effort. The 1986 farm bill drasti-
cally lowered loan rates, starting
the trend toward increased
decoupling. The 1990 farm bill con-
tinued down this path and allowed
farmers greater planting flexibility.
The 1996 farm bill adopted fixed
payments for the first time, and the
United States could rightly claim
that its farm policies had small ef-
fects on world market prices. The
consistency of U.S. farm policy with
the U.S. negotiating position allowed
U.S. negotiators to take the moral
high ground when it came to agricul-
tural subsidies, which put other
countries in the position of having to
defend their own subsidy stances.
Perhaps more importantly, by tak-
ing the visible lead on reforming its
own agricultural policy, the United
States empowered reformists in the
European Union and importing coun-
tries, such as South Korea and Japan,
to argue for more radical reform of
their own domestic policies. Most ob-
servers felt that the Uruguay Agree-
ment was simply the first step in
reforming trade-distorting policies, an
observation that was given credence
by passage of the 1996 U.S. farm bill.
The next step in trade negotiations
was for countries to make even more
radical cuts in subsidies. For example,
EU officials began to think about poli-
cies whereby decoupled payments
were made for rural development and
environmental quality. Politicians in
South Korea and Japan began prepar-
ing their farmers for less protection.
And African leaders saw that domestic
market reforms would pay dividends
as international agricultural trade
flows became dictated more by com-
parative advantage rather than by do-
mestic subsidies.
On the surface, not much has
changed in the U.S. negotiating pos-
ture. U.S. Trade Representative Robert
Zoellick says that the U.S. commit-
ment to the Doha agenda remains in-
tact. This means that the U.S. is
committed to substantial decreases in
import barriers and import tariffs, a
phasing out of export subsidies, and
substantial reductions in domestic
support programs that distort trade.
As previously noted, the new
farm bill neither increases nor de-
creases import barriers, and the U.S.
makes minimal use of export subsi-
dies (a favorite tool of the European
Union), so not much about those two
items has changed. But the increase
in some commodity loan rates im-
plies a discrepancy between U.S.
policy and the U.S. negotiating posi-
tion. Will this discrepancy help or
hurt future trade talks?
U.S. Department of Agriculture
Secretary Ann Veneman and Mr.
Zoellick claim that the new farm bill
enhances their negotiating position
because they can use the subsidies
as bargaining chips to get other
countries to reduce their subsidies
and to increase access to their mar-
kets. Whether or not this optimistic
view about the subsidies is correct
remains to be seen, but clearly,
when it comes to agricultural protec-
tion, the United States no longer
holds the moral high ground. Conse-
quently, its leadership position in
the upcoming round of talks seems
to be somewhat eroded.
FUTURE OF U.S. FARM POLICY
Does passage of the 2002 farm bill
mean that we will have a respite from
policy debates? Not if recent events
are any indicator. Many senators are
trying to come up with another emer-
gency spending bill for agriculture,
this time to alleviate financial difficul-
ties caused by drought. Will attempts
to provide drought aid to crop farm-
ers succeed when crop losses from
drought clearly are covered by crop
insurance?
By March 31 of 2003, the United
States and other countries must
present proposals for the structure of
new WTO commitments that are con-
sistent with the Doha agenda. How
will U.S. proposals be made consistent
with the new U.S. farm programs?
And, finally, it looks as though
Congress and the Bush administra-
tion eventually will have to figure
out how to limit current and future
budget deficits. How will supporters
of farm programs justify billions in
annual aid to large farmers when
Congress is looking for budget off-
sets to fund new priority programs
such as a drug benefit for senior citi-
zens? Stay tuned. The future looks
bright for those who enjoy good
farm policy debates. 
